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Book Reviews 
Soviet Semiotics: An Antho.[rgy edited, translated and with an introduction by 
Daniel P. Lucid. Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1977. Pp. viii + 259. $16.00. 
In the U. S. S. R., semiotics-the study of sign systems and signifying prac-
tices-is a lively discipline which has attracted outstanding scholars and given 
rise to an important body of work. Soviet Semiotics is an anthology of 
some of this work. It consists of 24 articles published between 1962 and 
1974 and grouped into six sections: General Concepts, Modeling Systems, 
Communication Studies, Text Analysis, Art and Literature, and Typology of 
Culture. Some of the pieces are quite short-at least half a dozen do not run 
over three or four pages-and most are by scholars who arc well known-if not 
often read-in the United States: Juri Lotman, for example, has authored or 
co-authored eight of the articles and Boris Uspenskij five. In an excellent 
introduction, Daniel Peri Lucid describes and discusses the development of 
semiotics in the U. S. S. R., from its early twentieth century roots in structural 
linguistics and formalist literary theory through its birth in the 1950's as an 
aid in tasks of machine translation to its coming of age as an autonomous 
discipline in the 1960's, with particularly active centers in Moscow and Tartu. 
Lucid also provides a good summary of the contents of the arrticles anthologized. 
A good bibliography of Soviet studies in semiotics and of discussions of these 
studies completes the volume. 
Characteristic of Soviet semiotic writing is the belief that any aspect Df 
human activity in the production, exchange and storing of information can be 
considered a (sub),text-a culturally meaningful system of signs-and can be 
studied as such: myth and religion (Zaliznjak, Ivanov and Toporov's "Structural-
Typological Study of Semiotic Modeling Systems "), cartomancy (Lekomceva 
and Uspenskij's "Describing a Semiotic System with a Simple Syntax," B. F. 
Egorov's "The Simplest Semiotic Systems and the Typology of Plots"), chess 
(I. 1. Revzin's "Language as a Sign System and the Game of Chess "), etiquette 
(T. V. Civ'jan's "Etiquette as a Semiotic System"), history (Uspenskij's 
"Historia sub specie semioticae "), personality (Piatigorskij and Uspenskij's 
"The Classification of Personality as a Semiotic Problem "), art (Uspenskij's 
"Semiotics of Art "), and so on and so forth. Texts can be grouped typo-
logically, with the typologies originating in cultural universals and cultural 
universals flowing from universals in human psychology (Lonnan's "Problems 
in the Typology of Texts" and "Numerical Semantics and Cultural Types," 
Lotman and Uspenskij's "Myth-Name-Culture "). Texts are modeling sys-
tems: structures of elements and of rules for combining them which constitute 
analogues to a given reality; natural language is taken to be the primary 
modeling system and all other signifying structures are considered secondary 
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modeling systems, built in terms of and upon natural language (Lorman's "Pri-
mary and Secondary Communications-Modeling Systems," Lorman and Piatigor-
skij's "Text and Function "). Culture is viewed as the most comprehensive system, 
uniting the entire aggregate of signifying structures, and human beings are seen 
not only as the modelers but also as the modeled, not only as creating signs 
but also as created by them. 
Unfortunately, equally characteristic of most of the articles making up 
Soviet Semiotics is their fondness for generalities. Though the anthology 
manages to suggest the tremendous implications semiotics and semiotic approaches 
may have for such diverse disciplines as anthropology, psychology, history, 
philosophy, sociology, literary analysis, or art criticism, though it addresses 
crucial problems (the articulation of synchronic description and diachronic 
description, for instance, or the segmentation of a text into primative elements) 
and though it makes provocative claims (does natural language underlie all 
non-linguistic systems of signs? are all such systems "unnatural"?), too many 
of the pieces anthologized are basically programmatic (" What is to be done? "), 
too many take hypothesis or argument for fact (p. 30: H the collective mono-
logue of children ... has parallels in the surviving archaic features of linguistic 
behavior in certain tribes"; p. 35: "the transformational rules ... in Chomsky'S 
transformational grammar correspond to real features of discourse analysis and 
synthesis as carried Out by people"; p. 41: "The sentences of language are 
iconic signs ") and too many are (not so) ingenious translations of either 
well-established or uninteresting facts (cartomancy and etiquette are semiotic 
systems; there is an analogy between natural language and the game of chess; 
Ionesco's plays investigate the nature of human communication). As such, 
these pieces justify the attacks of those who are unimpressed by semiotics and 
consider it to be a mere ecriture (as defined by the early Barthes) rather 
than a (nascent) science. 
This is regrettable because some of the articles collected by Lucid make 
interesting points and make them well. Thus, Lotman's "Problems in the 
Typology of Texts" distinguishes nine fundamental text types in terms of 
social function and argues that real texts represent a complex fusion of these 
types; Toporov's "The Semiotics of Prophecy in Suetonius" shows how omens 
and prophecies govern the composition and content of Suetonius' work; and 
Lotman and Uspenskij's "Myth-Name-Culture" suggests that poetry and myth 
are antipodal and establishes interesting parallels between mythological and 
scientific thought. Semiotics in general and Soviet semiotics in particular can, 
after all, be most fascinating and valuable. 
GERALD PRINCE 
University of Pennsylvania 
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The Gothic Visionary Perspective by Barbara Nolan. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1977. Pp. xviii + 268, 23 illustrations. $16.50. 
The thesis of this book is that in the twelfth century a new "perspective" 
or sensibility developed about visionary experiences. Artists began to create 
works intended to involve the viewer or reader in an experience like that 
of an "apocalyptic" or "anagogical" vision, one that saw the world in time 
and redemptive history and so included the last things. Professor Nolan 
begins "with descriptions of that perspective in its purest forms as it 
appeared in commentaries and treatises" (p. xv)-she gives most attention to 
commentaries on the Apocalypse by Rupert of Deutz, Joachim of Fiore, and 
Richard of St. Victor-and proceeds to discuss the way it appeared in the 
architectural idcas of Abbot Suger, the Gothic cathedral, and several illu-
strated manuscript Apocalypses. She doesn't <axgue that one manifestation 
caused the Dther, but that there was a U context of attitudes toward history, 
prophecy and vision developed by monastic and clerical writers of the 
twelfth and early thirteenth centuries"; this context helps explain some 
features of architecture and sculpture, manuscript paintings, and literature. 
The literary works treated in detail are the Vita NUOWf, Pearl, and Piers 
Plowman. In them we find an influence from memory systems, a use of linear 
narrative that tells the events of world history leading to the apocalypse, and 
a "double form in which a literal and allegorical sense are manifestly apparent 
in the poetic process" (p. 136). 
Visions in earlier times, it would seem, were just something in the Bible or 
something that happened to some saintly figure, something to be recounted or 
represented with diffidencc; in the twelfth century ,they became something 
that might happen to anyone, that could be simulated, that a reader Of viewer 
could participate in. Why and how this change took place is almost im-
possible to know. Prof. Nolan conjectures that it had a counterpart in the 
Eucharist as redefined by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 (material sub-
stance was an accidental "integument" for a spiritual presence); and, too, 
that the role of the audience changed-" no longer detached from the narrator's 
vision, they share with him the irony of an untenable situation .... They are 
expected to see both the visionary world as it is seen by the stumbling narrator 
and the same world in its universal or spiritual significance" (p. 141). The 
causes of this change in "perspective" were probably more wide-ranging, and 
I think she could have had more assistance from historians than she makes use 
of: for example, Colin I\t1orris's study of the "emergence of the individual," 
R. W. Southern's concept of "scientific humanism," or the researches of 
Giles Constable into twelfth-century spirituality. Individual experience comes 
into the picture vividly in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries in any 
number of ways-in the monasteries the imitation of the human Christ, in 
aristocratic circles "courtly love," in the yisual arts a new mobility and 
realism, in literature Ie psychological allegory." It's not surprising that redemp-
tiye history and eschatology became personalized too. 
It is probably unfair to judge this book by its thesis. The thesis is therc-
sblnething that can't always be said for scholarly b'ooks~but it keeps slipping 
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through one's fingers. There is a sort of logical development in the chapters, for 
yet they are by the author's admission a series of selective essays, each of which Itep 
"is also intended to exist as an independent entity" {p. xvii)-they can, she One 
suggests, be read out of order. But it is hard to understand the order they are see I 
in. After an effective chapter that explores Gothic cathedrals and illustrated look 
manuscript Apocalypses, we get a chapter on the Vita Nuova, perhaps the eye. 
best and most original literary analysis in the book This is followed by Dcp 
a chapter, "The Later lVledieval Spiritual Quest," which treats some earlier one 
writings in French. The author doesn't seem to explain why Dante is taken out seve 
of chronological sequence, and why Latin apocalyptic literature-Bernard of (FiE 
Morval's De contemptu mundi, for example-is ignored. untl 
And, too, the terminology is muddy. The visionary phenomenon being ~re 
described is referred to as an "experience" and a "mode "-but "mode," never Ho\ 
defined, is used in several senses, none tied to Northrop Frye's precise usc anS\ 
of the term. (I for one wish "mode" were banished from the critical peo 
vocabulary forever-it's in a class with "factor" and "parameter" and "in brig 
terms of": a linguistic black hole used instead of a term that has a dis- war 
cernible meaning.) In the book's title this phenomenon is called a "perspective," 
probably a linguistic black hole too. "Visionary perspective" doesn't appear 'I re 
until p. 44 and is not defined then or used much thereafter. The index, skimpy a ( 
on subject enrries, is of no help in pinning down such terms. "Gothic," by A I 
the way, evidently means nothing more than "late medieval." of 
The shortcomings of the book are those of its genre: it appears to belong insi 
to that increasingly prevalent genre, the Rewritten Dissertation. The exigencies and 
of academic promotion have required that such apprentice works. once published a cl 
(if at all) in discreet monograph series, go on parade as the work of seasoned no 
craftsmen. Their writers might be better advised to let the dissertation of 
languish and write something new: it's hard to remove from a dissertation and 
the telltale signs of haste, pressure, befuddlement, and conflicting advice. If art 
I am wrong about Prof. Nolan's book, it ,reveals a more alarming trend, that II 
academic books are beginning to imitate dissertations-not a promising develop- sup 
ment. Herbert Lindenberger has written about another rewritten dissertation It 
that the author" is more intent on engaging in dialogue with her mentors than '(al 
in addressing a larger scholarly audience ... .In speaking to one's mentors one res 
naturally shies away from generalities one fears would seem obvious to them." '\'is 
This would explain why Nol-an fails to lay it on the line about her terms or dis 
keep her argument in focus, and why her chapters are II independent entities.'1 the 
(It would explain too some small gaucheries: one book1s place of publication Iik, 
is given as "Maryland," for example, and a paper delivered at "the 1976 tel. 
Medieval Institute" is mentioned-by 1976 there would have been a dozen such M: 
Institutes.) One's mentors know everything about a dissertation because the vic 
author has explained it all to them (or they to the author) at length in ad 
their offices, usually before anything has been written; they get to be as close W 
to the work as the author, miss details, and lose touch with what a reader wants vi~ 
to know. of 
I found this problem of communication most troublesome in that part of the to 
b~ok dealing with art. The a~thor isn't an art historian and is writing chiefly th, 
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for literary scholars, but she speal{s of the art as if the reader is already one 
step ahead of her. I found myself mostly hopping behind. "The Lamb and the 
One Enthroned hold the book with seven seals," we read of Figure 16. I 
see the One Enthroned. Ah, yes, I see the Lamb. But they arc holding what 
look like sheets of paper, not a book, and there are no seals visible to the naked 
eye. Obviously there is in the writer's mind someone in the Art History 
Department with whom all this has been discussed. So on p. 66 we learn that 
one manuscript illustration" recollects St. John's vision of the Lamb and the 
seven-sealed book, to which Trier had devoted four full-page illustrations 
(Figs. 12-15), into a single dynamic composition "~but it looks to my 
untutored eye as if in Figure 15 the vision of the Lamb and the seven-sealed bOook 
are depicted together, so I am the less impressed by the dynamic composition. 
How will the untutored reader lose his innocence if writers don't foresee and 
answer innocent questions? Yet graduate education in the humanities leaves 
people more and more incapable of writing for the "general reader" -for 
bright graduate students, colleagues in fields other than one's own, people who 
want to learn. 
I mention this because the boole is, ironically, put forward as a piece of 
"reader response" criticism. Of course one can see how the sculptures of 
a Gothic cathedral were meant to involve the viewer in a programmatic way. 
A harbinger of this quality in art may well be religious writings like those 
of Joachim of Fiore that are "wholly personal and radically historical," that 
insist on "the centrality of a personal affective interaction between Revelation 
and the reader" (p. 25). But reading is one hind of experience, walking into 
a church or looking at a picture is another. Perhaps earlier Christian art sought 
no less to promote an "affective interaction" but did so under the conditions 
of a different sensibility; Nolan only wants to show what earlier art was not 
and so doesn't face this possibility. The important point isn't that Gothic 
art seeks involvement but bow it does so. 
In all this talk about involvement one can't help feeling that the author 
superimposed a "methodology" on a traditional piece of historical criticism. 
It isn't hard to believe that exegetes writing about the Book of Revelation 
"attended far more closely than had their forbears to St. John's cognitive 
responses to his visions, even suggesting that the reader might share the 
visionary's privileged experience" (p. 54f.) , and that a similar tendency is 
discernible in manuscript painting. But who is the reader? how does he use 
the book? Professor Nolan presumes a learned xeader who uses the pictures 
like a memory system, who views the pioture first, then reads the accompanying 
tcrt on the right and the gloss on the left, "step by step. and page by page." 
Maybe so, but what evidence is there? Might not the pictures have been 
viewed out of order? or shown to illiterate laymen and explained? or been 
admired by clergy who knew the text well and didn't bother to read along? 
We are told that "the illuminators ... sought to draw their readers closer to 
vision" (p. 76), that" a Trinity colorist could create a. Christ with a face 
of gold leaf gleaming from the page through which readers might be raised 
to divine contemplation" (p. 77). It seems a failure of imagination that 
these pit:;tures are taken to be "a reading experience," that artists are assumed 
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to have been painting in gold leaf for "readers." And it is confusing to find 
that "the reader" and "the audience" are the same (we read on p. 82 of 
"the audience, turning the pages of the book"): if" reader response" critics 
want to calculate an artist's expectations of response, they should be more 
rigorous. An imagined reader is an alter ego, a solitary person turning pages, 
but an audience is a social group; and there are readerships and "interpre-
tative communities" besides. 
The last half of the book treats the It visionary quest" in literature-in 
Dante, in several French poets (Raoul de Houdenc, Huon de Meri, Rutebeuf, 
Deguileville), and in Pearl and Piers Plowman. As a piece of literary criticism 
it is all the right things-historical, interdisciplinary, "textual"; the chapters 
are well organized, the writing clear and graceful. But the method is linear 
explication de texte of a kind that could have been written twenty-five years 
ago. It would have been better, or clearer, if each chapter were an essay on 
the "Gothic visionary perspective" in each poem-but one has to hunt for 
this. One finds it in a good deal of attention to the narrator (an intermediary 
rather like St. John in the illustrated Apocalypses) and to the" double form" 
(literal and allegorical), neither of which is a surprise. Nor does the "reader 
response" criticism of the earlier chapters bear fruit here; it has withered on 
the vine. The author sprinkles references to the reader and the audience-
"Will and the reader alike," "the dreamer and the audience," "Will (and 
perhaps the audience) ," and so on. There are curious statements like "the 
plowman is allowed to see what neither Will nor the pilgrims nor the audience 
can" (if the audience can't see it, how do we know the Plowman does?). 
But there is no effort to show how the language and the rhetoric of the poems 
create a reader "in" the wor1{, or manipulate our responses, or presuppose an 
imagined audience of a certain character. 
Was that audience the same for all works that involved a "Gothic visionary 
perspective"? Pearl with its number symbolism and intricacy, Piers Plowman 
with its scholasticism and Latin quotes and grammatical metaphors were 
obviously intendec1 for fit audience though few, but I suspect for quite 
different kinds of audiences. The thesis of this book proposes the rise and 
fall of a kind of visionary experience in art and literature, but doesn't bring 
it to bear upon, or find it in, the two English poems discussed. The chapters 
on Pearl and Piers Plowman are sensible readings, responsible, modest, making 
no undue claim to originality, rather minimally attentive to other critical 
interpretations. They don't bring the reader any closer to an understanding 
of what is "Gothic" about them or what the "visionary perspective" was. 
Piers Plowman is said to be the last example of the phenomenon, but the 
audience capable of responding to this kind of art must have lingered on: 
Piers Plowman had a continuing readership that included Spenser and Milton, 
but Pearl dropped out of sight and was not read again until the nineteenth 
century. Unless this was purely accidental, there must be a perspective in one 
poem that isn't in the other, and there must have been readers that felt the 
power of Langland's big shaggy work but viewed Pearl as a bejeweled popish 
reliquary. 
DONALD R. HOWARD 
Stan{rmi Univrmity 
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Medieval F1'ench Literature and Law by R. Howard Bloch. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1977. Pp. xii + 268. $14.50. 
In The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (1927), Charles Homer Haskins 
pointed out the connection between the resurgence of Roman law and various 
literary structures in the high culture of the Middle Ages. The resurgence 
occurs at a time when the anti-legal bent of the Cistercians and Spiritual 
Franciscans held popular sway. Bolognese jurists adapt the techniques of 
Biblical glossing and commentary to the Corpus Juris Civilis, and the epistolary 
style of the dictamen serves for drafting documents and legal teaching. 
CoevaIly, various librj de causis become sources for poetic composition. 
Bernard Silvestris draws on the pseudo-Quintilian Declanurtiones Maiores, 
and Peter of Riga comparably uses the Controversiae of the Elder Seneca. 
For vernacular literature and courtly culture, the relation is more difficult 
to trace. There is a social reality absent in academic verse, and the law 
incorporated by literature is frequently customary and traditional. The 
available compilations offer a retrospective view of practices rather than a 
source for textual borrowing. R. Howard Bloch's Medieval French Literature 
and Law examines these complex ties in the prose and verse forms of Old French 
and Proven~al. Bloch's concern is to follow the parallel transformations of 
social institutions and literary forms from the crisis of feudalism through the 
emergence of a courtly ethos. 
The opening chapters analyze the problematic relations of individual to 
society and aristocracy to monarchy. Bloch finds in the thirteenth-century 
La Mort Ie roi Artu a paradigm of the "crisis of values and institutions" 
that had developed over a century .and a half. The collapse of Arthur's 
kingdom would result not from fate or passions but directly from the failure 
of its legal system. Immanent justice, based on accusation and the judicial 
duel, proves vulnerable to subversion and bad faith: in the romance Arthur 
oversteps his role as judge, and Lancelot willingly perjures himself. But 
Bloch locates the defect " at the epistemological root" of the system: "Simply 
stated, the outcome of combat exists independently of the notion of cognitive 
truth." Customary procedures, unlike ius scriptum, are not concerned with 
reconstructing events, weighing intention, or judging proof rationally. Their 
inability to prevent recurrent violence assumes political dimensions in the feudal 
epics where the disputes of barons evolve a cycle of vendetta prompted in 
some measure by a sovereign'S injustice. The historical thesis is that techno-
logical advances which favor a strategy of defense in these disputes can be 
related to a shift in literary themes from the pursuit of vengeance to the 
impossible siege. Against critics who see the poems as embodiments of 
aristocratic or monarchic ideals, Bloch argues that the feudal epic cycle 
questions the very assumptions of a warrior society by emphasizing "the 
general failure of war" and" the price of victory." 
The inquest provides an alternative to the judicial duel and warfare. Its 
recreating events in written form changes the legal system from accusation 
to mediation based on abstract notions of truth. The growth of the inquest 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries entails different social relations and 
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poetic models. No longer will force signal divine purpose, but "artistic" 
probability and rhetorical flourish prevail. Similarly, colleotive action gives 
way to individual confrontations with a state apparatus. In poetry, these 
developments support "a tendency to individualize, to render abstract, and 
to verbalize" struggles. The courtly lover becomes alienated from his lady, 
from other courtiers and pocts, and finally from his emotions and himself. 
Although one might complain that the literary theme is already treated in 
classical elegy and satire, Bloch seeks to objectify its medieval existence by 
concentrating on the definitions of self implied by the shifting institutions. He 
would derive such features as the isolation of romance heroes or the oppositions 
of the tel1so and joe partit from historical as well as literary impulses. 
The informing principle of Bloch's analysis is that both literature and law 
involve the displacement of action into verbal structures. By establishing this 
common ground, he is able to reassess the social configurations of various 
genres. The legal context explains the multiple tensions in the canso. There 
the poet's appeal, though addressed to his lady, directs a claim against third 
parties, whether they be lauzengers or merely rivals. The love plea approaches 
disputation, and its dynamic revolves around the issues of judgment and 
truth. Semantically, the terms joi and nzerei may connect the love lyric to 
judicial forms of wagering and awards. In the prose romance, displacement 
operates in the fiction that surrounds literary creation. The Pseudo-Map 
cycle consciously derives its -origin in the transition from aventure to legal 
records and then to a literary account. Documentation merges with mimesis, 
and the chivalric novel serves as a kind of deposition. The aim of such 
" translation" is "the fixing of the truth of the past so that it may be 
remembered in the future." Yet the functions of memory and preservation 
within a parchment bureaucracy suggest that other purposes have replaced the 
conservative motives of traditional cultures. 
The final chapter, on "The Ideology of C-ourtly Love," applies the 
historical and literary insights to a problem that has occupied scholars since 
Romanticism. Bloch portrays the courtly ethos as an ideal working against the 
interests of the nobility who embrace it. Individualism and the interiorization 
of values, which literature and law foster, aid the cause of monarchy by 
limiting the baronial recourse to violence and class solidarity. The theological 
insistence on intention and choice furthers "the designation of the individual 
as an autonomous legal entity." In the lyric the value of 112ezura enforces these 
limitations, but a crucial case appears in the Tristan myth. In the story of 
Tristan and Iseult, Bloch finds the model "birth of subjective consciousness 
and the foundation of the modern state." The episode in which Marc spares 
the sleeping lovers emerges as an illustration of social consciousness founded 
on notions of guilt and personal responsibility. Its meaning lies in the 
implied social contract between sovereign and citizen rather than the class 
identity of feudalism. It is on this contrast that subsequent literature relies. 
Bloch's study offers specialists and general readers a wider view of medieval 
French literature. The careful accounts of evolving legal institutions bring an 
important perspective to critical interpretation. Yet the value of the book 
goes beyond commentaries on the specific texts. Bloch has rightly decided to 
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treat law as an inclusive rather than a limiting term. The principles of 
medieval law, like those of its Roman predecessor, are both a model and a 
reflection of s?cial reality. The study is rooted in this dialectical approach to 
cultural and literary developments. It thus contributes a sophisticated theory 
of relations to the pmctice of historical criticism. 
ROBERT EDWARDS 
State University of New York at Buffalo 
H 071ze at Grasnzere by William Wordsworth, edited by Beth Darlington. Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1977. Pp. xiv + 464. $25.00. 
H omc at Grasmere is Wordsworth's long blank verse hymn of thanksgiving 
upon his retirement to the Lake District in 1799 after years of homeless 
wandering in the "wide waste" of the world. He began the poem in the 
early spring of 1800 as "Part First, Book First" of his unwritten masterpiece, 
Tbe Recluse, but beyond that ascertainable fact lie only mists of conjecture. 
The poem exists in several manuscript stages of completion, and each manuscript 
contains sections whose dating cannot be accurately fixed. As usual, Wordsworth 
left us too much and too little. Some portions of the poem are constantly 
present; others appear from nowhere in a fragmentary draft, and whether 
they are copies of an earlier lost manuscript or newly indited, none can say for 
sure. There are clues in dating-watermarks in the paper, references in letters. 
stylistic mannerisms-but all told the poem presents a set of hazards that 
would test any editor's judgment. 
The dating of Home at GraS1Jzere is of particular importance because the 
poem claims ra. present joy and a present sense of purpose. We know Words-
worth never entirely lost his love of Grasmere or his desire to "preserve/Some 
portion of its human history," but we also know that he did lose joy as time 
went on, and that his sense of duty narrowed into some unlovely forms. 
Precise dating can suggest more accurately the shape of Wordsworth's emotional 
life in some of his most creative years. It can indicate the continuity of his 
visionary stance, and the breaks in continuity when events caused him to 
revise or contradict his earlier beliefs. It may infonn us that he was capable 
of writing joyful passages while in the midst of personal grief-a discovery 
that might change some of our ideas about the supposed egotism of his 
imagination. 
Beth Darlington has benefited from the work of previous scholars of this 
i fascinating poem. Helen Darbishire reconstructed the "late n version of 
I the poem, called MS. D, and published it as Appendix A in Volume 5 of the 
Oxford edition. John Finch and James Butler produced useful studies of the 
text. Darlington deserves ultimate credit, however, for the painstaking pro-
duction of this edition, complete, as are other volumes of The Cornell Words-
worth, with photocopies of the chief manuscript pages and transcriptions from 
them en face. Most imponant, we now have the earliest full text of the poem 
J 
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(MS. B), evidently completed in 1806, running alongside the familiar MS. D. 
As with the 1805 Prelude, we now can evaluate the described experiences in 
their primary form. Darlington has made available in their proper context 
some early and deleted passages that will be debated over as long as there 
is Wordsworth criticism. 
In my book, Ruins and Empire, I have called attention to one of these, 
Wordsworth's claim 
That in my day of childhood I was less 
The mind of Nature, less, take all in all, 
Whatever may be lost, than I am now. (B. 94-96) 
Written sometime (probably 1800-1801) between the backward-looking "spots 
of time" which became The Prelude, 1798-1799, and the nostalgia of the first 
stanzas of the Intimations Ode, this affirmation of Adamic joy seems a 
precarious and poignant moment in the history of Wordsworth's self-analysis. 
Like other passages in Home at Grasmere it articulates a satisfaction with 
adult experience that wavered and finally vanished as family, friends, and 
landscape lost their radiant appeal to his mind's eyes. Wordsworth would never 
again make claims like these from the newly-published manuscript: 
In this majestic, self-sufficing world, 
This all in all of Nature, it ,vill suit, 
We said, no other [ ] on earth so well, 
Simplicity of purpose, love intense, 
Ambition not aspiring to the prize 
Of outward things, but for the prize within-
Highest ambition. In the daily walks 
Of business 'twill be harmony and grace 
For the perpetual pleasure of the sense, 
And for the Soul-I do not say too much, 
Though much be said-an imag'e for the soul, 
A habit of Eternity and God. (B. 204-215) 
This is clearly the period of "\Vordsworth's maximum optimism, sustained only 
a few years, ,vhich gave birth to the famous Prospectus, "On Man, on 
Nature, and on Human Life." Darlington confidently dates this latter 
discursive passage during the Grasmere years, rather than 1798-99, as some 
previous commentators have suggested. 
Home at Grasmere emerges as one of the sunniest of English poems, a pure 
expression of Hope in which the traditional heaven-haven of religious verse 
has been naturalized to a terrestrial location in England's green and pleasant 
land. We see the piety in the domestic dramas of the early draft, which 
the poct later transferred to The Excursion. We see the devotional fervor of 
W-Ordsworth's description of the birds whirling gracefully over Grasmere 
lake, a passage acutely analyzed by Karl Kroeber in Romantic Landscape 
Vision. And finally, this edition allows us to see Wordsvvorth breaking through 
the limits of his naturalized imagination as he (against his own will, one feels) 
converts the beloved scene before him into a religious emblem: 
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A symbol of Eternity & heaven 
Nor have we been deceived: thus far the effect 
Falls not below the loftiest of our hopes 
Tis not in holy Nature to betray 
Or disappoint her genuine Votary 
My trembling Heart acknowledges her Power 
To be divine; & therefore infinite. (p. 355) 
431 
Wordsworth never included this fragment in any full draft of the poem, but 
its existence informs us of one spiritual mode, or rather one terminological 
mode, that he needed to excise. That, in turn, is another clue to his poetic 
'development. 
Not all the transcriptions of cancelled passages are so interesting, of course. 
Some are entirely useless: 
What [?] [? life] 
[?] [? as ? above ?] [?] (p. 237) 
Fragments like this arc given a full page, as if they were pieces of the true 
cross. Art is our religion, and no better proof can be offered than the 
scrupulous exactitude of editions like this one. Fortunately none of the 
appani interfere with the reading text, printed separately, and Wordsworth 
scholars cannot help but be grateful even for scraps. 
The serviceable quality of Darlington's edition-I particularly appreciate 
the notes on all transcribed pages which key passages into the reading text-
should enhance the reputation of Home at Grasmere. Early critics took the 
poem at Wordsworth's own apparent valuation-they left it virtually untouched, 
with the exception of \Villiam Minto, whose appraisal of 1889 has been re-
printed in Wordsworth's Mind and Art, ed. A. W. Thomson (1969). "The 
verse is of the poet's prime," he noted, "a fragment of that impassioned 
history" which Wordsworth undertook to narrate in The Prelude. Critics of 
the latter poem now have no reason to neglect this companion work, coeval 
in composition, comparable (at its best) in poetic beauty and psychological 
interest, a new star in the constellation of Wordsworth's major writings. 
LAURENCE GOLDSTEIN 
The University of Michigan 
The Victorian Critic and the Idea of History: Carlyle, Arnold, Pater by Peter 
Allan Dale. Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 
1977. Pp. 295. $13.50. 
Sophisticated critical and scholarly investigation of Victorian literature pro-
bably can be dated from the appearance of Jerome H. Buddey's The Victorian 
Temper in 1951. Challenging the connotations of "Victorianism," nearly all 
disparaging, the book helped clear the way for an objective and less apologetic 
view of the literature of the period. Now, after more than a quarter-century 
of immense scholarly activity, we know in a general sense what the Victorians 
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thought; \\'C are aware of their shared ideas. What still remains to be conCI 
determined is the manner of Victorian thinking, the process by which common disco 
ideas were conceived. In an important essay_" The Formal Nature of cou1( 
Victorian Thinking," PMLA, 90 (1975), 904-18-Gerald L. Bruns has argued DiviJ 
that the distinctive feature of the Victorian mind is the way in which history retail 
is made to function as a formal property of thought. Examining Carlyle, of ~ 
Arnold, and Ruskin, Bruns shows that for the Victorian prose writers the Best 
meaning of an idea is inseparable from its history. of rl 
Although apparently unaware of Bruns's essay and of other recent literature 50 fi 
on the subject (about which I shall say more later), Peter Allan Dale in The the 
Victorian Critic and the Idea of History touches on many of Bruns's ideas to ilIusi 
demonstrate how historicism affected Victorian theories about the nature of \,iew 
art. Investigating works by Carlyle, Arnold, and Pater, Dale is concerned but 
with II the philosophical manifestation of the historical sense" especially as it does 
is reflected in the three authors' thoughts on aesthetics. in t 
The Introduction delineates the dimension of historicism in the nineteenth Am 
century. It shows how, replacing physics and metaphysics, the historical not 
process was set up as the most likely venue to an explanation of experience, la ! 
although ultimately a thorough-going historicism, with its insistence that Chr 
history is the end of knowledge beyond which the human mind cannot ge, T 
was rejected by nearly all nineteenth-century thinkers. crici 
Each author is treated in a section comprised of two chapters. The fust disc 
chapter examines the sources of and influences on the author's thinking about not 
history-the fonnation of his philosophy, in other words-and the second crit 
demonstrates how the writer's historical views inform his critical position. atte 
Each critic is examined with reference to three concerns: the genetic approach no 
to criticism-that is, the relation between art and historical or cultural exp 
forces; the role of art in society, specifically how it affects systems of sam 
belief; and the concept of aesthetic value, especially the effort to find firm con 
grounds for evaluation of art. In the last analysis Dale is interested in dis- Wru 
covering how each of the three critics reconciled himself intellectually and foe 
emotionally to the implications of a historicity showing continuously changing He 
belicfs and values through time. exp 
From the Gcrman Idealists Carlyle learned that "clothes," or systems of full 
belief in time, arc emanations of the Divine l\1ind outside of time. Henee resi 
if a my thus fails, a ncw my thus will arise, phoenixlike from the ashes of ide 
the old, so that man can be dclivered spiritually. The function of the F 
poet is to penetrate the veil thrown up by the Time-Spirit to discover sun 
things as they really arc, the Divine Idea. For Carlyle the test of a work the 
of art is its ability to induce in the readcr belief in the Idea that the work 1 
expresses. But, as Carlylc was aware, the dcgree of penetration is limitcd by the 
historical conditions. and to O,'crcome this difficulty in his aesthetic thcory hOI 
he {lined with the notion that the poet's special talent lies in his figurative or be 
symbolic expression. Yet in the cnd. becausc of a lack of critical sensitivity and has 
becausc of his preoccupation with o"crcoming the world of the Not-Self. mt 
Carlyle restcd his aesthetic theory on the truth-telling role of art. ani 
hiatthew Arnold learned from his fathcr and untimately from Vico the En 
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concept of the cyclical periodim.tion of history. Unlike Carlyle he was 
disconcerted by the spectacle of the endless passing of systems of belief; he 
could not give credence to the idea that the process emanates from the 
Divine. For him the developing Zeitgeist is a purely secular process. Yet, 
retaining a basically religious longing for a stillpoint amidst the whirling flux 
of history, Arnold fixed upon the concept of the harmoniously developed 
Best Self, a concept taken £rom the Stoics and Spinoz-a. which is independent 
of the process of changing ideas. Hence religious belief is to be valued in 
so far as it supports the psychological and moral organization of the mind, 
the belief itself being emotionally a sort of feeling and intellectually an 
illusion which refers to no reality outside itself. Reflected in his poetics, this 
view causes Arnold to stress not the truth-telling role of art, as in Carlyle, 
but its ability to evoke moral and emotional attitudes in the reader. How 
does art do this? By form, 'aIchitectonics, the grand style. Locating value 
in the supposed permanent emotional and moral needs of the personality, 
Arnold in effect denies the historical element in the work of art. He does 
not consider how the capacity to experience the inner peace of Dante's U In 
la sua volontade e nostra pace" can exist without faith in the medieval 
Christianity which inspired it. 
Tracing Pater's intellectual development, Dale locates the later Victorian 
critic within the empiricist tradition. He is particularly illuminating in his 
discussion of Pater's debt to John Stuart IVlill, although in my opinion he does 
not give sufficient prominence to the elements of Oxford idealism in the 
critic's thought. As an empiricist of Epicurean tendency, Pater made no 
attempt to transcend history: he accepted the historical process and looked for 
no spiritual reality behind it. Hence he relied on sensuous and emotional 
experience as the only experience of which we can be certain. Yet at the 
same time, in an effort to get beyond this, he embraced the concept of the 
continously developing culture of the race :as a value in itself. Ultimately he 
was little at ease with the complete historicist position. As a critic he 
focussed on the direct sensuous and emotional experience conveyed by art. 
He believed that from the perspective of his own Weltanschauung the artist 
experiences the sensible world, whose impression he assimilates and imitates so 
fully that his art becomes pure perception. The value of an art object thus 
resides in an inarticulate sensuous and formal condition, a complete unity of 
idea and expression. 
Following the section on Pater a short Conclusion, in which the author 
sums up his treatment of the three critics and suggests their importance, closes 
the book. 
The summary I have provided in no way does justice to Dale's book and 
the complexity of trootment of the three Victorian critics. Although the 
book is arranged in three chief sections devoted to one figure each, it would 
be a mistake to read only the section on Arnold, say, to :iiee what the author 
has to say about this particular critic. It would be a mistake because the book 
must be read in its entirety. For it is not only a study of Carlyle, Arnold, 
and Pater; it is also an investigation of the historicist oudook in Victorian 
England and, further, an effort to trace how Victorian critics attempted to 
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make of poetry a variety of religious experience. No other work with which 
I am familiar does this so well. I commend it highly to all who are interested 
in Victorian intellectual history and in Victorian aesthetic theory. 
I could wish, however, that Dale had addressed himself to the implications 
of Bruns's article mentioned earlier, because I believe that the book would 
have been even better had Dale attempted to go just one step further and show 
how history functions in the case of Carlyle, Arnold, and Pater as a fo-rmal 
property of thought. He comes close to doing this but never quite gets to it. 
It may be unfair to charge him with neglect of Bruns's essay because it may 
be that his study was submitted to the Harvard Press in 1975 and that it took 
the Press two years to produce the book. Yet I wonder about this. For 
when I look at the notes I find allusion to no work published later than 1972, 
Dale is presumably unfamiliar with, for example, Abbott Ikeler's Puritan 
Temper and Transcendental Faitb: Carlyle's Literary Vision (1972), David 
DeLaura's essay "Matthew Arnold and the Nightmare of History" CStratford-
upon-Avon Studies XV [1974]), or Har<lld Bloom's introduction to the 
Selected Writings of lValte1' Pater (1974)-a11 of which are pertinent to his 
concerns and the ideas of which one would have liked for him to engage. 
Could it be that Dale completed an earlier form of this study by 1972 and in 
reworking it did not keep up with ,the scholarship published during his 
revision? 
I could also wish that the book did not frequently suggest an underlying 
polemical purpose. Carlyle, Arnold, and Pater seem to be judged as thinkers 
and critics by the degree to which they approached complete historicism. 
Hence Carlyle is said to have "failed to satisfy the vanguard minds of the 
succeeding generation" who were "to seek their interpretations of life in 
the realms of philosophical and scientific thought rather than in intuition and 
fideismj to look to human nature and human society as the ultimate grounds 
for belief rather than to an otherworldly Absolute" Cpp. 86-87). Hence it 
is hinted that Arnold's work is limited because "Anlold, like Carlyle before 
him, ... obviously continues to believe in the possibility of achieving a new 
formula of belief that will deliver society from the abyss of relativism" Cp. 
168). Hence Pater is applauded because "like l\1allarme Pater is working 
against all metaphysical and intelleotuallist approaches to the spiritual principle 
in ar,t" (p. 219). In his summation Dale says: 
the critics I have been discussing [turned1 to poetry ... more and 
more ... as a substitute for the concept of belief itself. Whatever the 
value of this enterprise as a criticism of Efe, its value for criticism 
was extremely important. By undermining the concept of belief itself 
the historicist outlook at the same time undermined the ancient as-
sumption that poetry is a variety of truth or knowledge, closer to 
philosophy than to history. In this its tendency was ever to compel 
critical attention back upon more specifically aesthetic criteria for 
the discussion of art and to liberate art from subservience to criteria 
more suitably applied elsewhere. Cp. 255) 
Thus Carlyle, Arnold, and Pater appear to be important as critics because 
they prepared the way for t\ventieth-century fonnalism; they seem to be 
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important as historical thinkers because they anticipate the complete historicism 
of Collingwood, Croce, Dilthey, Meinecke, and Ortega. One comes away 
from the book with the impression that Dale finds his three Victorian subjects 
interesting and valuable just to the degree they depart from the transcendental 
thinking of the Romantics and point towards the positivism of the present 
century. 
Whatever reservations I have about the book are, however, comparatively 
minor, and in stating them I do not mean to give the impression that I do not 
v.alue Dale's work highly. Tbe Victorian Critic and the Idea of History is an 
important boole. In my estimation it is one of the most valuable studies of 
Victorian literature published in recCnt years. During a period like the 
1970's when the historical dimension of literature is increasingly regarded as 
a significant area of study Peter Allan Dale's book, with its learning and its 
clarity of expression, is especially welcome, because it can serve as a model 
for the kind of literary-historical scholarship that one would lil{e to see pro-
duced. 
CLYDE DE L. RYALS 
Duke University 
Cbnrles Clmrcbill by Raymond J. Smith. New York: G. K. Hall & Co., 1977. 
Twayne Series. Pp. 156. $8';0. 
Graduate studcnts, as they prepare nervously for examinations, often give 
one another sample questions. The questions I remember had either a trick 
(" what is the great epic poem of the Restoration?"), or a joke (" who is the 
oldest dog in literature" ?), or else probed the gaps in which only minor 
authors are found (" name the most important English satirist between Pope and 
Byron "). This was the context in which one learned about Charles Churchill, 
and for most, he remained only a name, mattering little more than Hector the 
Toothless Hound, the name of Natty Bumppo's dog. 
Those who bothered to read Churchill, however, would be pleasantly sur-
prised. Here was a writer of immense vigor and considerable skill, who poured 
out words in torrents and lashed victims by the score: an entertaining man at 
the very least, good value for time spent, especially among the poets of the later 
eighteenth century. The careful reader would find every requisite of the 
satirist's art: a sophisticated satiric persona, biting enemy portraits, clever 
fictions, skillful verse, effective \vords and figures, interesting shifts of tone 
and point of view, moral earnestness and a sensc of humor. His performances, 
furthermore, seem better to fulfill the canons of his own time than the 
performances of Pope. If the satirist shall tell the truth, he is much more 
literal than Pope; if the satirist shall be a good man with no secret eD\·ics, 
he is more forthright than Pope; and if the srrtiris( shall be heartily angry at 
yice, Churchill is so handsomely direct as to nuke Pope seem dcdous by 
comparison. Yyor 'Vinters could declare that Churchill's bst poem, the 
"Dedication" to "\Varburton, was better than anything in Pope and Dryden 
oombined. 
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Yet Churchill remains neglected, perhaps because his excellences fade when 
when we put down his book. They are genuine, but they are diluted. His 
satiric persona runs dangerously close to self-indulgence; his portraits bite, 
but they lose force when they chew some detail to a pulp afld leave the essence 
untouched; a clever fiction, if pressed too hard, will cease to seem clever. 
Churchill flows so copiously that skillful lines and effective words get swamped 
among the ordinary; and his shifts of tone sometimes seen random. The 
eighteenth-century canons of satire, despite their popularity, are crude: a 
satirist, like other poets, needs a shaping imagination first, "truth," candor, and 
anger second; Churchill is more forthright than he is inventive. Despite the 
praise of Winters and a fine edition by Douglas Grant, studies of Churchill 
have been few: a book, a handful of articles, and now, this second book, 
written for Twayne. 
Being a book about a neglected figure, it is obliged to make him as interesting 
and attractive as it can. Being a book for Twayne, it is required to summarize 
each work in chronological order. The second concern cannot help the 
first. Churchill's virtues do not shine forth in methodical summaries of his 
themes and occasions, and his significance does not -appear in brief, judicious 
estimates of each poem's success or failure. The reader who does not know 
Churchill's work already will get some sense of it this way, but not a lively 
one, nor can a book of this kind make him eager to read it. But tIllS is to 
cdticize the format more than Professor Smith: his information is accurate, 
his judgments are unpretentious; his prose is lucid. The reader who needs 
the political and personal background of the poems will find it here, and in 
those spaces where the format allows it, the literary historian can find some 
interesting and helpful things to think about. 
Professor Smith's analysis giv·es us a satirist who makes the conventional 
points one expects in Augustan satire, uses its devices with ease, alludes to 
its entire range, abides by its canons. Churchill -asserts ".reason," just as he is 
supposed to do, but as Smith points out, he actually defines what he means by 
it, and this turns out to be his own, individual Teasoning, not some established 
order to be taken for granted. The result is nearly to reverse what one finds 
in Dryden and Pope: Churchill asserts the individual, not society; idiosyncracy, 
not constraint. His creed is !rational freedom, but not in the style of Dryden's 
cousin at Chesterton or of Pope in his grotto; he celebrates the genteel excess 
and insouciant freedom of John Wilkes. He can stay within the canons of 
Augustan satire and resemble in tone and demeanor that most" un-Augustan" 
of writers, Laurence Sterne. All of this is caus~ for thought: do H pre-
Romantic" experiments come about because an author adheres more closely 
than before to the &tandards that Augustans profess? 
Smith alludes to another matter more interesting still: Churchill, in certain 
places, has a trick of dissolving words. He employs them in ironic contexts 
and at the same time exploits in them a kind of "doubleness" (p. 32) which 
makes us unable to be sure that they have their meanings any longer. They 
may mean one thing, or they may mean its opposite: what force they have 
depends entirely on the author's mind, and the author, being ironic, speaks 
indirecdy. At its best, in the Wa:rburton poem, tIlls technique puts us 
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directly in contact with the moral circumstances that concern the poet: our 
effort to understand him makes us judge them as if for ourselves. At other 
moments, Churchill's prolixity dilutes the ,effect. But here is where Churchill 
is genuinely post-Augustan. Dryden and Pope could assume that words have 
meanings-fixed, objective significances to which their users ought to be respon-
sible. Pope did not expect such responsibility in the world outside his grotto, 
but he did expect it of his readers, for they share the grotto with him. 
Churchill not only does not expect it-at these moments, at least-but does 
not value it; he enjoys the problem of subject and object, for his rational 
freedom to make the world what he will is his summum bonum: tyranny is 
what frightens him, not chaos. 
Professor Smith cannot dwell on such topics for long, for he is soon required 
to sum up and get on with the next poem. Format summons, and he must obey. 
But the book has value. It does not persuade one to read Churchill for the 
first time, which is a pity, but it steadily helps those who are doing so, and 
intermittently, it speaks to those who have done so already. 
ALAN FISHER 
University of Washington 
The Chronicle of Leopold and Molly Bloom: Ulysses as Narrative by John 
Henry Raleigh. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1977. Pp. xi + 293. $12.50. 
Joyce's Ulysses and the Assault upon Character by James H. Maddox, Jr. New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1978. Pp. xi + 244. 
$14.00. 
Joyce's Moraculous Sindbook by Suzette A. Henke. Columbus, Ohio: University 
Press, 1978. Pp. xi + 267. $15.00. 
The title of John Henry Raleigh's book, The Chronicle of Leopold and Molly 
Bloom, describes what it is; the subtitle, Ulysses as Narrative, what it is not-
unless Raleigh means by narrative that the years between 1865, the beginning 
of the Chronicle proper, and 1904, the year in which the action of Ulysses 
is set, follow each other in prediotable sequence. As a chronicle, Mr. Raleigh's 
book tells us most everything we might want to Imow about the Blooms and 
a good deal about which many readers of Ulysses ought to care less. We learn 
of the Blooms' ancestry and family history, of their respective childhoods, of 
their courtship, their friends, their attitudes and opinions about nearly every-
thing (much of the Chronicle consists of reproduction chunks of the text 
of Ulysses rearranged chronologically when possible and topically when 
chronology is irrelevant). Although much of the material Raleigh records, 
including the usual run of Dublin arcana, details of timing and placement, 
inconsistencies in the narrative, volitional and non-volitional errors by Joyce 
, 
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and/or his characters, is collected in other reference books and in numerous 
articles on Ulysses scattered hither and yon, Raleigh's useful innovation is 
chronology. He literally lets the naturalism Df Ulysses follow its course, 
Therefore the Chronicle begins in the year 1865, the year Rudolph Virag 
arrives in Dublin and subsequently conceives his son, Leopold Bloom (Virag 
changed his name in 1866). And the Chronicle ends with DNa appendices, one 
a list of Bloom's addresses beginning in 1866, and another a chronological list 
of Bloom's jobs beginning in 1881 and continuing to the book's present. 
Raleigh claims he began WO!fk on the Chronicle as a hobby during the years 
he was an administrator at the University of California, Berkeley. A hobby 
is usually obsessive and a hobbyist usually gets his facts right. Raleigh scores 
on both counts. The book is filled with the minutiae, quiddities, and accidents 
of over forty years .of a fictional couple's history (I emphasize fictional because 
somewhere along the line Raleigh has lost the distinction between literary 
characters and real people). Insofar as accuracy goes, the Chronicle is 
relatively error free. There are a couple of lapses on p. 72 and p. 77 where we 
are told after separate entries first to see pp. 00 above and then p. 00 below, 
a nifty trick in either case. But for the most part Raleigh is accurate. He 
is also, by turns, fascinating and maddening. After a helpful excursis, for 
example, into the Hungarian byways (paternal side) of Bloom's family history, 
including a report on the theory of naming in eighteenth-century Hungary 
and a speculation on Joyce's habits of transliterating names, Raleigh records 
the name Karoly as that of Bloom's maternal grandfather. Claiming to "know 
Joyce," Raleigh guesses "that KalToly was not the original name which the 
father of Higgins changed to Karoly." Since the name Karoly is mentioned 
only once in Ulysses, there is no fictional context for worrying over this matter. 
Here and elsewhere Raleigh goes too Lur-he assumes that a narrative record 
has a naturalistic life of its own even when the interpretive reward for such 
speculation is nil. Raleigh's obsession with the pre-life and "after-life" of 
literaTY characters is of a different order than, say, Hugh Kenner's recent 
speculation about unnarrated events during the day of Ulysses, events that we 
can assume have taken place and that directly affect narrative context. Much 
of Raleigh's speculation affects nothing. Later in the Chronicle we learn that 
the month of Bloom's proposal to Molly is not mentioned in Ulysses. But 
Raleigh very much wants it to be May. Naturally, he tabulates the number 
of times each month is mentioned in the text and concludes that May wins the 
day (or the month, as the case" may" be). The fact that two occurences of 
May in the text refer not to the month but to Mary (May) Dedalus does not 
daunt Raleigh in the least. Rather, it's his "last point" in an argument that 
has lost touch with logic and skirts perilously close to parody. May, it seems, 
was the familiar name of Joyce's mother, thus proving that Bloom proposed to 
Molly in May. 
Raleigh will obsess over these things-that is the way he reads Ulysses. But 
I am less bothered by Raleigh's perception of "real " or recordable detail (present 
or absent in the text) than with his svrange conception of his book as an 
introduction to Ulysses as Narrative (subtitle). Along with some statements 
in the introduction to the Chronicle, the subtitle misleads the unsuspecting 
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reader about the contents, format, and utility of Mr. Raleigh's book. Even 
though Joyce, as Raleigh points out, was interested in naturalism and lectured 
on the naturalism of Defoe's work, the recovery of naturalistic sequence does 
not justify billing Raleigh's book as a guide to narrative issues in Ulysses. In 
his prefatory statements, Raleigh protests too much. The first among multiple 
purposes for the Chronicle suggests that the book is "to serve as an intro-
duction to Joyce for the uninitiated who are, understandably, intimidated by 
the bulk and complexity of Ulysses in tota." Later, Raleigh advises that" the 
Chronicle is no substitute for the novel, merely an introduction," as if anyone 
would misperceive it as a substitute. The mere idea suggests priorities have 
gone awry. Like other reference or guide books, the Chronicle can provide 
information for both the uninitiated and the initiated, it can put matters of 
narrative event into chronological sequence, it can clear up beclouded fictional 
history. But finally, it is an adjunct to Ulysses not an introduction to it. Those 
who have some experience with Ulysses are not likely to be taken in by 
Raleigh's half-hearted attempt to foist his book off as something it is not. 
Those who come to Ulysses thinking Raleigh's book will tell them something 
about narrative are in for a surprise. 
If Mr. Raleigh's subtitle is misleading, James Maddox's title, Joyce's Ulysses 
and the Assault upon Character, is simply less elegant than his book. Just who 
is assaulting whom? I think Maddox means assault in several senses: assault 
as an attempt, a means of "getting at" character; but also, especially in the 
radically stylized chapters of Ulysses, an attack on the notion of centrality in 
representing character in the novel. But" assault" is the wrong word for 
Joyce whose aesthetic sympathies, like his politics, were pacific by design. If, 
however, Maddox means the assault in his title to refer to his own rather than 
joyce's treatment of character, then I think he misperceives his own critical 
finesse. Maddox is not an assault artist-he is less the Rocky Marciano of 
Joyce criticism than its Sugar Ray Robinson. 
Maddox's choice for a title bears upon an assumption controlling his book, 
an assumption stated explicitly carlyon. l'vladdox belongs to the school of 
Joyce whose spiritual leader is S. L. Goldberg, to whom Maddox alludes in 
the space of a few pages as overwhelming, definitive, brilliant, elegant, and 
aesthetically hoarding (Goldberg keeps "the baby with the bath water"). 
Like Goldberg, Maddox is bothered by the "encyclopedic" Ulysses whose 
various and distorted styles detract from the sine curve of character. He 
writes emphatically though, to his credit, less often than Goldberg of "the 
severe limitations of these styles which have lost touch with their subject 
matter" (p. 186). Oddly enough, Maddox even likes some of the chapters he 
feels compelled to question; nevertheless the assumption that Ulysses risks 
losing touch with its subjeots (literally, its people) governs the argument and 
organization of the book. Maddox discusses Ulysses by re-arranging its 
chapters on the basis of a kind of character quotient. Those chapters with 
most "character," so to speak, get discussed first. It is not in the least 
surprising that Maddox is better, much better, on those sections of Ulysses 
stylistically closer to the consciousness of its charaoters. His treatment of 
• 
440 BOOK REVIEWS 
Stephen in Proteus, for example, is extraordinarily supple, one of the best 
readings of that chapter available; and his reading of the early Bloom chapters 
is first-rate, Maddox is also excellent on a latcr chapter like N {(usicaa, a bit of 
a breather as prelude to the complicated night chapters to follow. Generally, 
l\1addox is weak and tired in his treatment of the larger, encyclopedic, and 
parodic chapters of Ulysses. He is a good enough critic to provide some 
trenchant observations about Aeolus, W Cmde1"ing Rocks, Sirens, Cyclops, Oxen 
of the Sun, Circe, and Ithaca, but for the most part he fights old battles, re-
hashes old material, and seems anxious to get on with what he does well, to 
return to the consciousness (his consciousness and theirs) of character. Maddox 
sees character (and what it constitutes) as the primary form of Ulysses. 
Characters are "souls" with marking and idiosyncratic rhythms. Joyce's 
fiotion records sets of relationships among a soul and its rhythms. its sur-
rounding physical world, its record or memory, its incremental patternings 
(authorial allusions, archetypes, and correspondences). What makes the matter 
of character fictionally generative for Maddox is the paradoxical notion that 
while the "soul" is essentially ineffable, indefinable, irreducible, numinous, 
mysterious, and in spiritual motion, the fictional stuff of Joyce's world is 
anything but ineffable-it is materially and historically reproduced; it is physi-
cally and artistically textured. So the guiding technique of joyce's representing 
method presents a character (s-oul) knowable by repe-ated sets of relations 
with things around or surrounding it, from controlled epiphanies to focused 
correspondences (parallax) to kinds of interchangeability (metempsychoses). 
Maddox explains: "Joyce's art is the art of the unspoken, an art of surround 
and periphery, implying and evoking but never naming the center" (p. 12). 
"Whether we are spe-aking of the epiphany, of characterization, of the 
manipulation of style, or of the use of correspondences, the primary con-
figuration within UlysseS is the same: a collocation of details which point 
toward an unnamable center" (p. 15). 
Maddox's ideas about character may focus on ineffable centers, but they do 
not produce ineffable results. As a critic, he is precise, clear, intelligent, 
resourceful, and generative. Although he is !DO generous and too thorough 
in presenting, repeating, and reformulating the strategies of others (Noon's 
Aquinian speculations, Goldberg's Joycean aesthetics, EHmann's triangulations), 
the patient read~I will endure just to see Maddox rekindle sparks of interest 
from the dying embers of rthe obvious. The book is filled with throwaways 
as productive as the winner of the Gold Cup race. Stephen, as Maddox points 
out with economical precision, acts as if he has -a need to be watched. Maddox 
gets him right. Bloom operates by a kind of internal gyroscope. Maddox 
sees Bloom's essential rhythm as «self-dispersal and reassimilation." Simon 
Dedalus is wonderfully described as a "synedoche for his city." Maddox 
suggests that the declension of Bloom's name in Circe is something of an epic 
descent (or decline). In Cyclops, Bloom's lot is given paradoxical formulation: 
"the unbenefitting apostle of compassion." Maddox cleverly marks Nausicaa 
as a turning point in the novel, the difference, so to speak, between day and 
night. On a few occasions, almost too few to mention, Maddox nods. I wish 
he would not have referred to the jargony "solution of his [Bloom's] 
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life-problem." Even more, I wish he had not said "But then wham" in 
reference tQ one 'Of Molly's quick transitions. And I wish there were a 
little less bowing and scraping at the feet of S. L. Goldberg. These are minor 
matters. Maddox has written a good book. 
Suzette Henke's title, Joyce's Moraculous Sindbook, is neither misleading nor 
inappropriate; it's simply portmanteau. "Moraculous ... sindbook' is 'One of 
joyce's many references to Ulysses in Finnegans Wake. Combining morality 
and miracle, sin and sind (German" being" in forms 'Of the present indicative), 
the configured title implies a movement from ethics to what Ms. Henke sees 
as phenomenological transcendence. The central thesis in Ms. Henke's book 
is that rthe three main characters in Ulysses, unable to deal fully or satisfactorily 
with the pressures of the world in which they circulate, make something of 
a phenomenon of themselves-they move out of the physical and culture-bound 
world into the liberating world of the creative imagination: "In the course of 
the novel, the three protagonists escape from 'sin' into a realization of 
existential Dasein" (p. 10). I wonder if Bloom, reading the Sweets of Sin at 
the bookstall, would see it this way? 
All important creativity for Ms. Henke is post-creative, that is, Nietzschean: 
"Joyce's A1oraculous Sindbook is an attempt to re-create Ulysses as an 
existential act of mind and a phenomenological life-world" (p. 11). The 
characters and, presumably, the readers and perceivers of the phenomenological 
systems in Ulysses adjust to "a life-world beyond the scope of immediate 
experience ,j (p. 6). For John Henry R<31eigh, the world of Ulysses is so real 
it needs a chronicle; for Suzette Henke, the referential world is the 
enemy and Joyce's characters in Ulysses are all artists waiting for their work 
to happen in their heads: Joyce" delights in the capaciousness of the human 
imagination and implies that every individual can become an 'artist of life' 
through myth, sympathy, and creative fantasy" (p. 12). Stephen is a "self-
declared artist .of the beautiful." Bloom is an "unselfconscious artist of 
sympathy." Molly is perhaps "the most prolific artist in Ulysses." Art (art) is 
democratic. Any question of craft is held in abeyance or rendered impotent 
(potential put behind, I suppose, since most democratic art in the book is the 
articulation of memory). Ms. Henke's attitude toward art as craft is some-
thing like Stephen'S attitude toward work: WDrk? Count me out. 
joyce's characters ought to give up on their worlds because they can more 
profitably negotiate their own interior spaces: "Joyce's characters move 
from a world of psychological enclosure to an existential liberation of con-
sciousness" (p. 12). Or, to report it another way: "The true protagonists of 
Ulysses-Stephen, Bloom, and Molly-all exult in the playground of the mind" 
(p. 8). One doesn't so much want to deny such a statement, one merely 
wants to ask, only in the mind and nowhere else? If Bloom's walks around 
Dublin are the "F£eudian perambulations of a masochistic id," and if Molly 
is "the Logos that arises from sensuous experience and perpetually affirms 
existence in a yea-saying moment of transcendent ekstasis," one is forced to 
conclude that for Ms. Henke the important things in Ulysses a.re out of this 
world. 
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btfore t~ 
Ms. Henke has been at work on her book for seven years and seems to cited as : 
have cast a nearly and deciding vote for Phenomenology. She claims allegiance SO to sp 
to Geneva (Phenomenology) and an -older New critical Haven. She ac1mow- phenomel 
ledges as one of her champions J. Hillis Miller, the late 1960's advance &II1ali ani 
man for Phenomenology in America. But Miller's Geneva lights have dimmed remark 
only to flash again in a N c\ver deconstructionist Haven. Henke's plight is II Cissey'5 
something like that of .Max Beerbohm who took several years to master the ideas of what dOl 
Henri Bergson only to complain that his" philosopher's" once rising star was now 
descendant over the hnrizon. Henke's problem is that she hasn't moved fast Coltmll 
enough for Phenomenology in these, our modern moments. But she doesn't 
need Phenomenology. Once she sheds her jargon and banishes her sources 
to footnotes, she is actually a fine critic of the much more various states of 
mind that joyce's characters display. 
A paragraph by Henke on the choices, strains, and anxieties of Stephen The Vi! 
Dedalus looking into a mirror is worth a chapter of phenomenological jargon. H. 
An observation that Mary Dedalus enters in upon the scene of Ulysses like a xxii 
pre-Raphaelite painting is better than a host of debatable remarks about the 
liberation of consciousness. Noting that Gerty ,MacDowell is the perfect crea- Readir 
ture to be attracted to (and by) an ad man is both pertinent and witty. Lenin's I 
Pointing out that Bloom's sense of feminine interchangeability is so strong that ~ unintl 
for him to make love to anyone besides Molly would be a kind of incest is Marxism 
kinkily apt. Ms. Henke can be a good critic; her difficulties come when she sible, at 
absorbs herself with special phenomenological pleading. When she takes the things " 
same hostile stance towards the material and physical matter of the book that errors, I 
she assumes Joyce's charaoters take she is Cyclopean and unifocal. For ex- enough 
ample, she writes of the newspaper world of Aeolus: "The newspaper world political 
is a microcosm of paralysis and of mechanistic aggression." It is that, no in Tela 
doubt, but the newspaper is also part of the stylistic "stuff" of Ulysses, an edited a 
urban daily organ in a novel partly dedicated to recreating one or another Frank 
daily organ from the day of its plot to the body of its schema. Ms. Henke inmates 
is only intermittently receptive to the variety of fictional programs in Ulysses. Eugene 
The style of Moraculous Sindbook is, like its title, oracular, even gnomic. unjUSt s 
Previous commentators on Ulysses, Ellmann and Kenner among them, share in would 
this tendency. Ms. Henke tells us that "Bloom is an artist of compassion; FrankliE 
,Molly, an artist of passion"; H Eros is transient, agape transcendent"; "Bloom one of 
warrants our pity, but not our tears." I mention these observations not to Franklir 
condemn them, but to record a stylistic feature prominent in Ms. Henke's not, so 
boole. Some readers may find these formulations helpful. chains : 
There are t¥lO mattei'S I would mention in conclusion. Ms. Henke, like institutil 
so many critics before her, assumes without reservation that Stephen urinates Whatsoe 
on the beach in Proteus, although she admits that his effort (for this "relief" The on 
much thanks) "undergoes such extraordinary celebration that the physical act is bet\\ 
is barely recognizable." Perhaps it is barely recognizable because it does not he teaci 
happen. In a recent essay, David Hayman argues that Stephen masturbates convict 
rather than urinates, but I have yet to read an argument on this matter that soc~l ( 
convinces me the passage in question refers to anything but Stephen contemplating whke I 
moving back across the tidal pool on the strand distinctly named Cock Lake tnost p 
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before the advancing water cuts him off. The passage in Proteus is usually 
cited as an instance of Stephen generating artistic material out of his own self, 
so to speak; but physical reality here seems to take precedence over the 
phenomenon of creativity. Another small, organic matter as so many matters, 
small and otherwise, are in Ulysses: Ms. Henke refers to Cissey Caffrey's 
remark about Bloom's II masterworks ... out of order," and concludes that 
"Cissey's pun reflects the dysfunction of both timepiece and codpiece." Just 
what does a phenomenologist think a codpiece is? 
MICHAEL SEIDEL 
Columbia University 
The Victim as Criminal and Artist: Literature from the American Prison by 
H. Bruce Franklin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. Pp. 
xxii + 337. $13.95. 
Reading Franklin's book on American prison literature makes one recall 
Lenin's comment that intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than 
is unintelligent materialism. Here is materialism so unintelligent that vulgar 
Marxism acquires new dimensions and reaches new depths one thought impos-
sible, at least in a book published by an academic press. There are so many 
things wrong with this book that only a lengthy essay could unravel all the 
errors, but The Victim as Criminal and Artist is not important or substantial 
enough to deserve that much attention. (For a detailed discussion of Franklin's 
political and theoretical assumptions, I recommend a review by Paul Breines 
in Telos, 15 [Spring, 1973], 138-145, of The Essential Stalin which Franklin 
edited and introduced.) 
Franklin's major thesis is that the real criminals have not been prison 
inmates but plantation owners, middle class racists, and capitalists. Whereas 
Eugene Debs believed that the existence of prisons was symptomatic of an 
unjust society and that it was a socialist goal to create a world where prisons 
would not be necessary, Franklin means something much simpler; in fact, 
Franklin never suggests that prisons ought to abolished, which is of course 
one of the dominant themes of revolutionary prison literature. According to 
Franklin, although slavery was abolished after the Civil War, capitalism was 
not, so that slavery merely changed its form. If in 1850 blacks were in 
chains as Southern property, since then blacks have been enslaved by penal 
institutions. Despite so much discussion of black culture, there is no analysis 
whatsoever of l'acism; rather, racists, especially academics, are sneered at. 
The one important distinction he makes in a book not terribly discriminating 
is between the II collective revolutionary consciousness" of blacks, which 
he traces from Douglass to the Panthers, and "the loneliness of the isolated 
convict ego, branded and cast out, seeking either to reintegrate with the 
social order or to defy it in anarchic rebellion" (p. 262). Although some 
white prisoners also have what he calls revolutionary consciousness, for the 
most part whites tend to be conformist or individualistic. Even this idea 
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makes little sense if one examines the literature. For example, George 
Jackson turned violently against his own upbringing, family and culture, and 
turned toward a highly individualistic self-discipline, reading Marx, Lenin, and 
Mao. Jackson created a revolutionary self .after bracketing out black American 
culture; it was only after becoming a revolutionary that he began to identify 
sympathetically with other blacks and those parts of himself he suppressed in 
order to become a revolutionary. 
Although the book approaches a kind of black nationalism, Franldin tries 
to be even-handed, matching (like a Federal judge) every chapter on black 
oolture with one on a white author. Following the first chapter on the slave 
narrative is a. chapteT on Herman Melville entitled H The Worker as Criminal 
and Artist." How worker Melville was able to achieve such infallible anti-
capitalist lucidity while other white workers and prisoners were unable to do 
so Franklin does not say. Those readers who have detected a nihilistic streak 
in Melville's work will find Franldin dismissing out of hand all such con-
siderations. Chapter Three is on black culture-slave songs, work songs, 
prison songs (on which Franklin has nothing new to say, with whatever valid 
insights there aJTe coming from the scholarship of Bruce Jackson)-while the 
fourth chapter discusses some white prison authors in addition to black authors. 
Chapter Five matches white Malcolm Braly with black Chester Himes, and 
the last chapter discusses recent prison literature, mostly black. This absurd 
balancing act unsuccessfully conceals a politi Gal assumption which infonns the 
book but which is never stated as such: the black nation, as he calls it, is the 
vanguard of the proletariat which will lead us in a socialist revolution. One 
absurdity leads to another. 
Franklin advances our knowledge of prison literature not one iota, although 
the bibliography is extensive. The gravest weakness of the book is its peculiar 
kind of nationalism because prisons, especially today, are an international ques-
tion. From Attica to the Gulag, from Chile to Cambodia, the issues of 
imprisonment, torture, crime and punishment, -and social control are urgent and 
demand serious attention. Ideas dragged out of Depression Marxism will 
hardly do. Franklin discusses a large body of American literature in a way 
that is neither Hluminalting nor useful; that literature remains to be analyzed 
intelligently. 
MICHAEL ScRIVENER 
Tii ayne State University 
Dcfamiliarization in Language and Literature by R. H. Stacy. Syracuse: Uni-
versity of Syracuse Press, 1977. Pp. xi + 193. $14.00. 
This study borrows the concept of I' defamiliarization" from Victor 
Shldovsky's "Art as Technique" (1917) and argues that his Russian Formalism 
offers a valid approach to literature today. For Shldovsky, the work of 
literature was an autonomous language system set in opposition to the "prac-
tical" discourses that depend on habitual perception: "The technique of art is 
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to make objects 'unfamiliar,' to make fonns difficult, to increase the length 
and difficulty of perception because perception is an aesthetic end in itself and 
must be prolonged. Art;s a way of experie'llci'llg the artful'll8$$ of 4'Il object; 
the object ittelf is '!lOt import4'llt." Although his term presupposed the familiar 
and consequently presented artfulness as a modification of historically fluctuating 
cultural norms, Shklovsky reduced the various motives, messages, and effects 
of literature to " defamiliarization," a single universal drive for technical 
innovation and perceptual renewal. Stacy uncritically accepts this definition 
of ott as technique and of perception as an end in itself, denying as a 
consequence the importance of content and context. 
Shldovsky formulated his radically synchtonic description of literature as 
a corrective to the literary criticism of his liay that intepteted art in the 
light of simple notions of history and the history of ideas. He thus made 
technique the subject of serious critical attention. Failing to acquaint an 
American readership with this legitim.re contribution by Russian . Formalism 
in the development of European literary theory, Stacy presents defamiliarization 
as an undiscovered and total aesthetic. He suggests that in fact the poetics 
of snch recent critics as Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva are restatements of 
Shldovsky. To the contrary, Fredric Jameson has shown in The Priwn-House 
of Ltmguage that Formalist isolation of the work of literature prompted 
subsequent poetic theory to reconsider the work of art in its communication 
situation and thus establish new relationships between art and cultural history. 
Coming in the wake of such corrective responses as structuralism and semiotics, 
Stacy's formalism is simply anachtonistic. In the ""pious sequence of ex-
amples that makes up the body of his book, furthermore, Stacy extends 
" defamiliarization" to include changes in practical as well as poetic language 
so broadly that the term, for lack of the precision it gained from Shldovsky's 
own applications, becomes too general to be meaningful. 
NANCY ARMSIRONG 
WaY'lle State Umver,", 
